We consider H expected utility maximizers that have to share a risky aggregate multivariate endowment X 2 R N and address the following two questions: does e¢ cient risk-sharing imply restrictions on the form of individual consumptions as a function of X? Can one identify the individual utility functions from the observation of the risk-sharing? We show that when H 2N N 1 e¢ cient risk sharings have to satisfy a system of nonlinear PDEs. Under an additional rank condition, we prove an identi…cation theorem.
Introduction
In [6] , Townsend tested restrictions of e¢ cient risk-sharing in a pure exchange economy on data from three villages in Southern India. In Townsend's model, the risk to be shared between the di¤erent agents is unidimensional and Townsend's test was based on the idea of comonotonicity: if a risk-sharing is e¢ cient then it should be comonotone in the sense that the consumption of each agent should be nondecreasing in the total resource. In the present work, we want to address the multivariate case where the resource to be shared has several dimensions (wheat and meat production for instance) and we shall see that in this case there are some sharp restrictions on e¢ cient Department of Mathematics, Birzeit University, P.O. Box 14, Birzeit, PALESTINE maloqeili@birzeit.edu y CEREMADE, UMR CNRS 7534, Université Paris Dauphine, Pl. de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris risk sharings that take the form of systems of nonlinear PDEs. We shall also prove an identi…cation theorem i.e. that under some rank condition the knowledge of an e¢ cient risk sharing enables us to reconstruct some sharp information on individual preferences and Pareto weights. The idea of comonotonicity has been developed further in a series of papers. It has been shown to extend to utilities which are not of von NeumanMorgenstern type, notably RDU (rank-dependent expected utility) (see [2] ), and to extend to the multivariate setting (see [3] ). The framework of the present work is that of the e¢ cient risk-sharing of some multidimensional risky resource X among several expected utility maximizers with strictly concave and smooth utility functions that are not known to the econometrician. As observed in [3] , the …rst-order condition gives that the consumption of agent h takes the form X h = rV h (rV (X)). A …rst question is whether such forms entail sharp restrictions on the consumptions X h as functions of X, for instance in the form of a system of PDEs. The second issue we shall address is whether the knowledge of the X h 's as functions of X enable us to identify the individual preferences. To be complete, one should also take into account the economic integration isue i.e. the further requirement that he functions V h and V should be concave, however, this problem will not be addressed here.
We make no assumption about risk-sharing within the group, except that the result is e¢ cient. So our paper is part of the growing literature on formal models of e¢ cient group behavior (see [4] for a survey). This literature considers each group as a black box: inputs (prices, initial endowments) and outputs (consumption) can be observed but individual allocations cannot. One can observe aggregate consumption of the group but not the individual consumption of its members. The problem then is to recover individual consumptions with minimal assumptions on the allocation mechanism within the box. This minimal assumption is that the allocation mechanism is ef…cient i.e. Pareto-optimal. Browning and Chiappori [1] have shown that this is enough to derive restrictions on aggregate demand, analogous to (but di¤erent from) the classical Slutsky conditions of consumer theory and they have tested these conditions on microeconomic data.
Another issue to bear in mind is the so-called identi…ability problem (see [4] , p.7 for a full discussion): we will not assume that the demand functions have a particular form (so our model is non-parametric) but we will assume that they are smooth functions and that we can observe them. Of course, in any practical situation, one can only observe …nitely many values. Proceeding as if one could observe the full demand function is an intermediate step for the econometrician. If we can recover the individual demands in that case, it will be up to him to …nd the adequate tools to recover the collective demand functions from …nitely many points. If he cannot, even with that much information, then clearly he will not be able to do it neither from a …nite amount of data.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in section 2. Necessary conditions for a risk-sharing to be e¢ cient are given in section 3 in the form of systems of nonlinear PDEs. Section 4 is devoted to identi…cation issues.
The model
Consider H 2 expected utility maximizing agents that have to share ex ante a risky multivariate aggregate endowment X that is some (essentially bounded say) R N -valued random vector with N 2. Ex-ante, the agents have to decide on how to share the total resource X between the H agents in an e¢ cient way, this leads to the following program
where the h > 0's are the Pareto weights and U h are agents'von NeumannMorgenstern utility indices. Assume that the utilities are C 2 , that D 2 U h is negative de…nite everywhere and set V h = h U h , the solution X = (X 1 ;
; X H ) of (1) can be obtained as X h = X h (X) where for every x 2 R N , (X 1 (x); ; X H (x)) solves the sup-convolution problem:
The …rst-order optimality conditions of (2) read as
V h being the Legendre Transform of V h so that rV h = rV 1 h and p(x) being the vector of shadow prices i.e. the multiplier associated to the scarcity constraint P H h=1 x h = x which can be computed as
The fact that the Pareto weights are …xed and do not depend on X is precisely justi…ed by the fact that the agents ex ante make a commitment on an allocation on the contract curve before the risk is realized.
so that
; H:
The issues we shall investigate in the sequel are the following:
Necessary conditions/restrictions: Given maps
that sum to the identity map, what conditions should they satisfy if in addition, they come from a risk-sharing problem of the form (2) (without knowing neither the utility functions U h nor the Pareto weights h )? As seen in (3), each X h should be the composition of two gradient maps, the second one being independent of h, we shall see that when H is large enough (more precisely when H
) this imposes that the vector …elds X h 's solve a system of nonlinear PDEs.
Identi…cation: When the X h 's are obtained from an e¢ cient risksharing process, can one recover information about the individual preferences i.e. about the functions V h = h U h ? We shall see that under some rank condition, there is identi…cation i.e. the knowldege of individual consumptions as functions of the aggregate consumption enables one to reconstruct the functions V h .
We shall not address here the issue of su¢ cient conditions (which seems more delicate and which we plan to develop in a subsequent work with the tools of exterior di¤erential calculus) neither that of economic integration (i.e. the further requirement that the primitives V h should be concave, or at least quasiconcave).
Necessary conditions
Before going further, let us set some notations. We denote by M N the space of N N real matrices, by A the transpose of A 2 M N , by S N (respectively AS N ) the subspace of M N consisting of symmetric (respectively antisymetric) matrices and by GL N the linear group of nonsingular matrices. We shall denote by hA; Bi := tr(A B) the usual inner product on M N matrices and recall that S N and AS N are orthogonal supplementary subspaces for this inner product. For A 2 M N we denote by sym(A) its symmetric part i.e. sym(A) = 1 2 (A + A ). Finally, given a linear map Q we denote respectively by R (Q) and N (Q) its range and nullspace.
General case
We are given H vector …elds X 1 ;
; X H that sum to the identity i.e.
and we wonder whether these X h can be obtained as a solution of a nondegenerate risk-sharing problem as in section 2 i.e. can be written as in (3) for some functions V h and V with a nonsingular Hessian. Taking x 2 R N (…xed for the moment), di¤erentiating (3) we get
so that in particular each F h is nonsingular,
and one can …nd nonsingular and symmetric matrices S h and S such that ; F H ) we may rewrite as ( ) = (S 1 ; ; S h ). A necessary condition for the F h = DX h 's to satisfy (5) for some V h and V is then:
As we shall see in the next lemma, it is convenient to express (7) in terms of the linear map L 2 L(AS
Note that if the matrices F h are observed, the maps and L are known, in the sequel, we will derive restrictions on these maps. Lemma 1 Let 2 S N then the following assertions are equivalent:
? .
Condition (7) is thus equivalent to the fact that R (L) ? \GL N 6 = ; which in particular implies that L is not surjective.
? means that for every (A 1 ; ; A H 1 ) 2 AS H 1 N one has 0 = tr(
which is equivalent to the fact that h ( ) 2 S N for h = 1;
; H 1 but recalling (6) we also have
This proves the desired equivalence.
We deduce the following restrictions on nondegenerate e¢ cient risk-sharings:
; X H (x)) is a nondegenerate e¢ cient risk-sharing then it solves a system of nonlinear PDEs expressing the fact that the map L de…ned by (8) is nonsurjective.
the fact that L is nonsurjective entails restrictions on the Jacobian matrices
. More precisely, in this case, (7) implies that all
minors of L should identically vanish: since L depends linearly on the DX h 's this gives a system of (H 1)N (N 1)=2 N (N + 1)=2 equations that are homogeneous of degree
in the derivatives (DX 1 ; ; DX H 1 ).
Remark. In fact (7) is stronger than the condition that L is not surjective since it requires R (L) ? \ GL N 6 = ;.
Remark.
To obtain restrictions as above, it is important to consider the whole system F h = S h S, h = 1;
; H. Indeed, each equation F h = S h S taken separately only implies that F h is the product of two symmetric matrices and according to a theorem of Frobenius (see for instance [5] ), any matrix can be written in such a way.
Remark. The proportional risk-sharing rule corresponds to the most degenerate case where L 0, indeed in this case F h (x) = h I N for every x (where the h 's sum to 1), so, for every (A 1 ;
;
Special cases
We now consider some special cases and write explicitly the system of PDEs that nondegenerate risk-sharings should solve in these cases. These two cases are the …rst ones for which e¢ cient risk-sharing implies some nontrivial restrictions namely:
the case of 4 agents and 2 goods, in this case L can be identi…ed with an endomorphism of R 3 and (X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ) should solve one PDE, the case of 5 agents and 2 goods, in this case L can be identi…ed with an element of L(R 4 ; R 3 ) and (X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ; X 4 ) should solve a system of 4 nonlinear PDEs.
These two cases also illustrate the general case. In fact, the computations and arguments below can easily be generalized to larger values of H and N for which H so that k = 1 and then N = 3 and H = 3. If N is even, N 1 being odd, it follows from Gauss Lemma that N 1 divides N so that N = 2 and then H = 4.
The case H = 4; N = 2 Writing X h = (X 1 h ; X 2 h ), we have
let then
a direct computation gives
so that a necessary condition for (X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ) to be an e¢ cient risk sharing reads:
The case H = 5; N = 2 Denoting for h = 1;
; 4, X h = (X 1 h ; X 2 h ) and performing similar computations as before, we …nd that a necessary condition for (X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ; X 4 ) to be an e¢ cient risk sharing reads:
Identi…cation
In the previous section, we have found necessary conditions on the Jacobian matrices F h (x) = DX h (x) for (X 1 ;
; X H ) to be a nondegenerate e¢ cient risk-sharing. In this section, we address the identi…cation issue: we assume that x 7 ! (X 1 (x);
; X H (x)) is a nondegenerate e¢ cient risk-sharing and we wonder what information on the individual preferences and on the shadow price can be deduced from this risk-sharing.
Given a nondegenerate e¢ cient risk-sharing (X 1 ; ; X H ) we wish to …nd functions (maybe locally) V h and V smooth and with nonsingular Hessians such that X h = rV h rV; h = 1; ; H:
By assumption, X h can be written in such way, and the identi…cation problem consists in reconstructing the functions rV h and rV from the knowledge of X h ; this essentially is a uniqueness problem. The best one can hope is to identify rV h and rV up to a common translation (adding the same linear function to the V h 's does not a¤ect the corresponding risk-sharing) and up to a common multiplicative factor. In other words, what one can expect to identify at best is the collection of Hessian matrices D 2 V and D 2 V h up to a multiplicative constant.
In general, one cannot expect an identi…cation result, even for linear e¢ -cient risk-sharing rules. In the linear risk-sharing case, DX h is a nonsingular matrix and the identi…cation problem consists in studying the uniqueness (up to a multiplicative constant) of the decompostion X h = S h S with S h and S symmetric. If X h = h I N (proportional risk sharing) the decomposition is highly nonunique since S can be any symmetric nonsingular matrix and S h = h S 1 . We do not have identi…cation in this case and this is related to the fact that under proportional risk-sharing, the map L de…ned by (8) is identically 0. More generally, thanks to Lemma 1, we know that when R (L) has a codimension larger than 2 then there is nonuniqueness of the decomposition 2 but we will see that when R (L) has codimension 1, there is identi…cation even in the nonlinear case.
In the previous section, the value of aggregate endowment x was somehow frozen, it is now essential to let x vary and in particular to emphasize the x-dependence of the map L de…ned in (8), from now on, we will therefore denote this map by L x .
Identi…cation when R (L x ) has codimension 1
For all x 2 R N , we of course assume the rank condition
which we already know to be necessary for (X h ) h to be an e¢ cient risksharing. Our aim is to identify the shadow price rV (and then the preferences) near a point
which implies that for every x in a neighbourhood U of x, the subspace R (L x ) of S N has codimension one 3 and thus an orthogonal of dimension 1. For all x 2 U, we may therefore …nd a symmetric (and nonsingular since (X 1 ;
; X H ) is nondegenerate) matrix (x) such that:
Moreover, thanks to condition (10), it is easy to see that we may choose x 7 ! (x) in such way that is C 1 with respect to x.
Again denoting F h = DX h , we know that there are smooth functions V h and V with nonsingular Hessians such that
for every x and we want to deduce as much information as we can from the X h 's to reconstruct rV and rV h . It follows from Lemma 1 that
for some nonvanishing scalar function . In particular, by Schwarz's symmetry theorem, in addition to the symmetry of T , one should have
To see that these equations enable to recover (hence D 2 V ) in a neighbourhood of x up to a multiplicative constant, we shall use the following: Lemma 3 Let T be an N N symmetric and nonsingular matrix and let (e 1 ; ; e N ) be the canonical basis of R N then the family fT ij e k T kj e i ; i; j; kg spans R N .
Proof. It is easy to see that the desired statement amounts to prove that the linear map 2 L(R
N and all (i; j; k) 2 f1; ; N g 3 is injective. Let x be in the null space of i.e.
T ij x k = T kj x i ; 8i; j; k multiply the previous by arbitrary reals i and j and sum over i and j to get hT ; i x = h ; xi T ; 8( ; ) 2 R N R N taking = x we thus get hT x; i x = jxj 2 T ; 8 2 R N choosing 6 = 0 orthogonal to T x, since T 6 = 0 we deduce that x = 0.
The following identi…cation theorem follows:
Theorem 2 Let (X 1 ; X H ) be a nondegenerate e¢ cient risk-sharing such that the rank condition (10) holds in a neighbourhood of x 2 R N , then there is local identi…cation of shadow prices and preferences: one can deduce from (X 1 ;
; X H ) the shadow price rV (x) (up to a multiplicative factor and an additive constant) in a neighbourhood of x as well as the marginal utilities rV h in a neighbourhood of X h (x) (up to the same multiplicative and additive constants).
Proof. Assume that X h = rV h rV then as already noted D 2 V (x) = (x)T (x) where T (x) is a given S N -valued map and does not vanish and should satisfy the system of linear PDEs (12) in U, which we simply rewrite as b r = a ; = (i; j; k); b (x) = T ij (x)e k T kj (x)e i :
It follows from Lemma 3 that the family fb (x)g spans R N for every x 2 U hence the system (12) contains as subsystem a system of the form B(x)r(log( )(x) = a(x) for some B(x) 2 GL N so that r(log( )(x) = B(x) 1 a(x) which means that hence D 2 V (x) is determined up to a multiplicative constant and thus rV = 0 rV 0 +p 0 where V 0 is totally determined (and has a nonsingular Hessian) by the risk sharing and 0 2 R n f0g and p 0 2 R N are two constants. Once one knows rV one easily obtains the desired identi…cation of rV h by observing that X h = rV h rV can be rewritten as rV h = rV X The previous result is optimal: we already explained why the rank condition is important and why the quantities that may be identi…ed are rV h and rV up to multiplicative and additive constants.
The particular case H = 4, N = 2
We now restrict ourselves again to the simplest case H = 4, N = 2.
The linear case
Let us …rst consider the case of a linear risk sharing where X h (x) = F h x (x 2 R 2 , h = 1; ; 3) and denote by f
We wish now to identify D 2 V which is of the form (x)T (x) and the fact that T is a Hessian …eld gives the system of two PDEs: We now wish to emphasize the fact that since the previous vector …eld is a gradient, we have an additional third-order nonlinear PDE for (X 1 ; X 2 ), namely
this supplementary equation is another necessary condition for e¢ cient risksharing.
